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Musings Report 2024-17 4-27-24 Pieces of the China Puzzle
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Pieces of the China Puzzle
As a 50+ year student of China's history, culture and intellectual heritage, I hesitate to share my own thinking about China because I fear that what interests me is too obscure to be of general interest. On the other hand, what's obvious may be less consequential than what's obscure.
By way of example, this recent article in Foreign Affairs on Xi Jinping's campaign to unify Confucianism and Marxism was of intense interest to me on multiple levels. The Real Roots of Xi Jinping Thought: Chinese Political Philosophers’ Long Struggle With Modernity.
As the author noted, "his attempted synthesis of Marx and Confucius has prompted bafflement, even mockery, among observers outside and inside China."
To me, there is nothing baffling in this synthesis; it not only makes perfect sense, it can be understood as essential in the broader context of China's history and culture. In my view, Xi has grasped the necessity of recontextualizing the national identity and the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party's control of the nation and its government.
To discuss these topics with any clarity, we must establish some context, both for the topics and for those exploring them. Everyone has an opinion, but not all opinions are equally grounded. So please bear with me for a moment before we pick up a few pieces to the China puzzle.
The university system is geared for two tasks: 1) giving student a general knowledge of subjects that builds a foundation for further learning (either academic or self-taught) and 2) the production of scholars and researchers with deep knowledge of narrow, specialized fields. I use the term "working knowledge" for the foundational knowledge base that enable both the organization of additional knowledge and a grounded understanding of causal connections and complexities in a subject.
A significant percentage of the ocean of opinion / commentary we swim in seems generated without the benefit of a working knowledge of the subject. Without a working knowledge, we lack the means to analyze the contexts and conclusions being presented with critical rigor. Without an informed critical analysis, we're at risk of accepting misleading simplifications as insights. This applies to topics from science to history.
For example, if we're discussing directed beam weapons, we're well-served by a working knowledge of physics in terms of the energy requirements needed to generate the beam, the energetic potential of the beam, etc. We don't need to be "experts" per se to expose claims to critical analysis; basic physics offers a sound foundation. We may reach an incorrect conclusion, but a working knowledge increases the odds of reaching a reasonably grounded conclusion: a directed beam weapon plugged into a wall outlet cannot incinerate a vehicle hundreds of yards away due to the limits imposed by physics.
The point of all this is to gently suggest that much of the commentary we're presented about China offers little evidence of a working knowledge of China's history, culture, economic structures and intellectual heritage, and therefore the context and conclusions being presented are more likely misleading rather than insightful.
Yes, propaganda is ubiquitous in our world, and commentaries may be designed to mislead or provoke. Setting aside propaganda / narrative control, what's left deserves to be analyzed critically.
China is not alone in being complex; many nations and regions are equally complex. We approach the immense complexity of human history and culture with humility and seek to expand our knowledge base with wide reading, including scholars' research. Without this knowledge, our views are doomed to superficiality. This is not a judgment, it's cause and effect.
In summary, the more we know, the more circumspect we become about making broad claims and projections.
I am not a scholar, nor am I able to read source documents, as I neither speak nor read Mandarin. I've studied Marx and China academically (under Prof. Chang chung-yuan), read widely, been on the ground and have close Chinese friends.
This informs my hesitancy to share thoughts on China, as I am acutely aware of how much I don't know, and can't know, and how much I might have missed.
In that context, I offer the following observations about China not as completing the puzzle but as pieces of the puzzle.
Foreign commentators must acknowledge the sensitivity around critiquing other nations. I think it fair to say that 1) the United States is the global capital of self-criticism; every element of American life, history, politics, etc. is openly criticized, analyzed, mocked, etc. within the US, a process I am part of; and 2) criticizing all things American is a global sport: everyone is welcome to join in and indulge themselves.
But this free-for-all process is rarely welcome when it is applied to other nations. Based on my firsthand experiences traveling in Asia, my impression is that national pride generally precludes all but the most mild and limited public criticism. Indeed, criticizing the leadership or national institutions will get you in trouble in some countries, and meet with disapproval in many others, as comparisons that could lead to a "loss of face" are to be avoided.
For example, while in Japan I mentioned the relative homogeneity of Japan compared to the US, and the response was a spirited claim that Japan too was diverse. I understood this to mean diversity between prefectures / regions in Japan, and accepted the point; but riding a train or subway in Japan and then riding BART from the San Francisco airport revealed that diversity in America is of an entirely different order of magnitude than in Japan. This comparison was viewed as diminishing and so a face-saving defense was summoned.
While in China, I mentioned the dominance of the Communist Party and was politely informed that the four smaller stars on China's flag represented minor political parties, hence there was a diversity of political representation. (I haven't found any evidence that this is the origin of the four smaller stars; perhaps it is.) That the CCP is the ruling body of the Chinese state and nation is unquestioned, but in this conversation the paucity of political diversity was understood as a weakness to be countered.
This sensitivity to perceptions--much of which (but not all) is embodied by the word "face"--appears across Asia. Consider Xi Jinping's response to the humorous linkage of his (faint) resemblance to Winnie the Pooh. A leader less concerned with "face" and more attuned to the opportunity to establish rapport with his citizenry might have joined the fun by positioning a Pooh bear prominently on his desk. In sharp contrast, Xi essentially outlawed posting images of Pooh in China. This doesn't speak to either security or rapport, and doesn't even lend itself positively to "face."
Yes, it's beneath the dignity of a great leader to be likened to a cartoon character, but compare this to the constant ridicule and mockery American leaders are exposed to as a matter of course. President Gerald Ford--an accomplished college athlete--was constantly depicted stumbling down steps, etc. President Jimmy Carter endured endless mockery of everything from his toothy grin to changing the part of his hair. And so on to the present leadership.
According to this article by someone with years of experience working in China, young people now avoid saying Xi's name out loud, as it's become sensitive to do so: How Chinese Students Experience America.
Is this merely a reflection of Asian cultural norms regarding "face" or does it reflect a much deeper insecurity? To dismiss the question out of hand is itself an expression of insecurity. These are the issues raised by the Foreign Affairs article exploring the monumental multi-volume work of Chinese scholar Wang Hui, The Rise of Modern Chinese Thought.
The idea of adapting to new developments (in our era, Modernism in all its forms) by reinvigorating Confucianism has deep historical roots, many of which were explored by Ray Huang in his book 1587, A Year of No Significance: The Ming Dynasty in Decline, which I referenced in Musing #53 last year and Musings #2 this year.
Confucianist values were in effect the glue binding together the vast Ming empire, an empire ruled by a tiny elite in Beijing (2,000 top bureaucrats) and managed by local bureaucrats in regional administrative nodes. It was considered essential that the Emperor adhere to these values and indeed exemplify them, lest the legitimacy of Imperial rule erode.
The need to support Confucian doctrines was not the sum total of challenges to the perpetuation of the Empire. Ray Huang summarized the systemic situation of the Ming Dynasty 57 years before its final collapse in 1644:
"The year 1587 may seem to be insignificant; nevertheless, it is evident by that time the limit for the Ming dynasty had already been reached. It no longer mattered whether the ruler was conscientious or irresponsible, whether his chief counselor was enterprising or conformist, whether the generals were resourceful or incompetent, whether the civil officials were honest or corrupt, or whether the leading thinkers were radicals or conservatives--in the end they all failed to reach fulfillment."
In other words, the structural rigidity of the Ming dynasty, rooted in its conception of Confucian values, doomed it to decay and collapse.
In Wang Hui's account, China's decline in the late 19th and early 20th century generated an intellectual ferment within China to synthesize new ideas (Modernity) with rooted-in-China Confucian thought. The context of this desire was the perceived need to base any change in Chinese thought, as adopting a "foreign" set of ideas and values would not have the same legitimacy as ideas with a Chinese origin.
This need is ultimately the driver of Xi's attempted synthesis of Marxism--the foundation of Communist rule in China--with Confucianism. While Chan Buddhism and Taoism are also of Chinese origin, Confucianism lends itself most readily to social and political controls, for Confucian principles place the highest value on obedience to traditional authority instantiated in a hierarchy: the emperor rules politically, the father rules the household.
The difficulty is there is really only one shared ontological thread in Confucianism and Marxism: Marx's starting point was Hegel's conception of history as proceeding on an inevitable trajectory. In Marx's view, this trajectory would culminate in socialism, "the dictatorship of the proletariat."
In Chinese thought, adherence to Confucian power structures and values will ensure a well-ordered, harmonious universe of heaven and earth, i.e. human society. Though not Confucian per se, a parallel belief held that China was the center of the world: in modern terminology, China was the Core and everything else was Periphery.
This is expressed in the two characters representing China, the first of which is often translated as "middle" (The Middle Kingdom) but which is more accurately in this context "center", i.e. The Center of the World Kingdom.
It is thus beneath the dignity of The Center of the World Kingdom to operate on ideas imported from lesser realms elsewhere. Thus the need to graft the foundation of the Party's legitimacy--Marxist thought and values--onto the root of Chinese social order, Confucianism.
But beyond this Hegelian ontology, the synthesis of Confucianism and Marxism runs into the incompatibility of the core ideas of each system. Marx's compatriot Engels envisioned the dissolution of the very family hierarchy that is the beating heart of Confucianism. Where Confucianist thought focuses on sacrificing to maintain stability and harmony, Marxist thought embraces revolutionary transformation as a historical necessity.
Marx's famous phrase "all that is solid melts into air" describes not just capitalism but history itself. To synthesize this "historical necessity" with Confucianist respect for tradition and obedience to authority is to claim that the CCP is the culmination of human history. But this is simply not realistic. Conditions change, challenges arise, crises occur, and human organizations must adapt.
The Communist Party's rule has been tumultuous on many levels. Discussing Mao's Cultural Revolution 1966 - 1976 is still sensitive 58 years later. The intellectual ferment of adapting Marxist thought with "Chinese characteristics" continues to this day, due to the many incompatibilities, starting with the fact that China had no proletariat class and had not advanced to the late stages of capitalism that Marx saw as the historical necessity before advancing to socialism.
Now that China has arguably advanced to the late stages of state-run capitalism under the CCP, now what?
There is a pervasive but unspoken sense of vulnerability in all this, a vulnerability borne of the incompatibility of the foundation of the CCP's legitimacy--Marxist thought--and the traditional Confucian values that Xi seeks to invoke to legitimize his quasi-Imperial personal control of the state and CCP.
As the article notes, China's extraordinary rise to global power lent its populace and leadership a sense of historical destiny: China will once again take its rightful place as the global hegemon. But structural limits akin to those described by Huang have manifested: funneling credit and excess savings into a real estate bubble is not sustainable or a productive use of capital and labor. Neither is local government dependence on the revenues generated by this rampant development.
China's current solution is to export excess production to the world (the Periphery) while limiting the intellectual / cultural influence of the world on China (the Core). In other words, China wants the world to be open to absorb its exports but to close the world off from China, which is now intent on becoming an autarchy that produces all that it needs other than hydrocarbons and minerals, which it is seeking to secure via alliances with Russia and Iran and investments in Africa and Latin America.
This has manifested in policies that can be summarized as "my way or the highway:" every deal should benefit China first and foremost. Projects funded abroad are constructed with imported Chinese labor, etc.
The world is becoming wary of such one-sided deals, and China's response has been heavy-handed. This ignores the lessons not just of previous Chinese dynasties but of all great empires ruled by small centralized elites: the incentives to cooperate have to be stronger than the potential benefits of resistance.
The Han Dynasty, like the Roman Empire of the same era, ruled vast territories more by cooperation and mutually beneficial trade than by force: both the Roman and Han armies were relatively modest in size and only deployed when treaties, trade deals and incentives failed.
My over-riding impression of the long sweep of Chinese history is that China prospers when it opens to the world and declines when it closes itself off. Xi's regime is closing China off from the world, and history doesn't offer any examples of this leading to hegemony or prosperity. Rather, it accelerates structural limitations of the kind Huang described. The Ming regime also suppressed foreign ideas and trade, partly because it lacked the means to control it. Xi's China has the means to exert a fine-grained control, but this control doesn't actually ease structural limitations. Rather, it protects the status quo from recognizing the inherent weaknesses of its core structures.
It seems clear that Xi's goal is to bolster the legitimacy of the CCP and nurture obedience to its authority by invoking Confucian ideals of "natural hierarchies" and "natural obedience." The secondary goal seems to be to shift the national identity away from a focus on economic growth as the source of legitimacy and identity to a focus on adherence to "Chinese characteristics" as the source of national identity and pride.
In this context, "Xi Jinping Thought" is understandably ambitious, for it is a recognition that legitimacy and identity are not permanent, and the structures that enabled China's fast expansion have now reached limits that threaten the rapid expansion that generated legitimacy and identity.
The parallels with the China of today and the Ming Dynasty don't stop there.
Despite its formidably boring title, a book review of The Administrative Foundations of the Chinese Fiscal State by Wei Cui (a book I haven't read) was revelatory, for the description of China's current tax collection system--"tens of thousands of neighborhood offices staffed by an army of local level revenue managers" who negotiate every business's tax payments informally, without depending on formal audits--mirrors the Ming tax collection system. (In both systems, meeting revenue targets is rewarded, failing to do so is punished.) This system works admirably well, collecting 20% of the nation's GDP in tax revenues.
What's striking is how well this describes the Ming system of tax collection in which local officials gathered tax revenues in a give-and-take relationship rather than a formalized system in which companies calculate their taxes based on tax codes. The similarity is remarkable.
This similarity exists independent of its recognition by Chinese authorities or the employees doing the tax collection. How many employees realize they would easily grasp the system used 600 years ago because the principles and processes are basically identical?
If the rules are effectively personalized rather than applied equally to all, isn't this one of the same structural flaws that undermined the Ming Empire? The personalized system works, but at what cost in structural limits?
China's long continuity of culture and history offers great benefits but also imposes great burdens: how to adapt without surrendering control, legitimacy and identity? Xi Jinping's attempt to graft Marxism onto Confucianism makes sense not just in terms of legitimacy but in terms of the structural limits of China's system.
What looks obscure to many is at the heart of the challenges facing China.
These pieces by no means complete the puzzle, but to me they fit snugly and meaningfully into the larger picture of China in 2024 and beyond.
Highlights of the Blog
The Ghetto-ization of American Life 4/25/24
Cities' "Doom Loops" Are Even Worse Than You Imagined 4/24/24
Is the 'Housing Shortage' the Result of Housing-Hoarding by the Wealthy? 4/22/24
Best Thing That Happened To Me This Week
Planted seedlings: eggplant, bok choy, tomatillo, Thai basil, heirloom tomatoes, flat parsley. It doesn't look like much at the start, hopefully they take root and grow.
From Left Field
NOTE TO NEW READERS: This list is not comprised of articles I agree with or that I judge to be correct or of the highest quality. It is representative of the content I find interesting as reflections of the current zeitgeist. The list is intended to be perused with an open, critical, occasionally amused mind.
Many links are behind paywalls. Most paywalled sites allow a few free articles per month if you register. It's the New Normal.
‘There’s a myth that it stops you from getting out of bed’: what high-functioning depression is really like
Why Is Biden Struggling? Because America Is Broken.
Japan Warns AI Could Cause Total Collapse Of The Social Order: The report stated that such technology is designed to seize users’ attention with little regard for morality or accuracy.
Mom endures ‘intensive’ chemo after terminal diagnosis that left her saying goodbye — only to find out she never had cancer at all (via Cheryl A.) -- get a second opinion....
Scrabble makes historic change to game with ‘less competitive,’ ‘inclusive’ version to appeal to Gen Z
Why Are Americans So Unhappy? A silent revolution is having enormous social ramifications
Stephanie Crohin: Japan’s Sento Ambassador Shares the Beauty of Bathhouses
Hey Doomers. Henry Gee has a New Book Coming Out.
‘It feels like the end’: Kelly Slater bows out after missing World Surf Tour cut -- end of an era...
The truth about protein: how to get enough – at every age
Telling the Truth About Our Future --Art Berman
How planning and infrastructure failed during Maui wildfires (via Tom D.)
The World Is A Ghetto (3:54 min) -- classic from 1973
"The most remarkable thing about my mother is that for thirty years she served the family nothing but leftovers. The original meal has never been found." Calvin Trillin
Thanks for reading--
charles |
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